Introduction
Historical work from the ' deeper past' about smoking has been relatively plentiful. and the earlier history of smoking as a cultural habit has been consistently explored 1 .But there is still surprisingly little historical analysis of the post World War Two years. 2 . These have been the province of journalism and of political science 3 , as well as of a growing historical activist strand of work. 4 This paper will focus on the development of smoking policy in those post war years both as study in contemporary history, and also a story indicative of the dimensions of post war public health policy. Traditions of voluntary regulation in smoking policy, supported by some public health interests, came increasingly into conflict with an emergent militant 'healthism' from the 1970's. 5 The role of science and of new 'scientific facts' was of central policy significance in this struggle: that scientific battleground changed over time. Policy and 'scientific facts' were locked into mutually reinforcing relationships . 6 This paper aims to identify the nature and determinants of the changing science and policy relationships within UK smoking policy. Its purpose, unlike much policy commentary on smoking, is to raise historical questions about policy ,to establish the process of historical change in the post war period, rather than to support particular solutions.
There has been a substantial reduction in the proportion of cigarette smokers in the UK population , from 51% of men and 41% of women in 1974 to 28% and 26% respectively in 1998. While prevalence declined steadily throughout the 1970s and '80s, it levelled out during the 1990s. However, figures for the second half of the 1990s showed smoking falling again among both men and women.. A clear class gradient in smoking developed since the 1970s when smoking was a cross class activity. In 1998, men who lived in 'unskilled manual' households were nearly three times as likely as those who lived in professional households to smoke.
Womens' smoking increased in the immediate post war years, but, like that of men, it began to decline from the 1970's. In the early 1970's a higher proportion of men than women at all ages were smokers. Since then prevalence at all ages has fallen faster for men than for women, so there is currently a similar prevalence at all ages for men and for women. Prevalence fell most for those over 50 and least for those under 25. Whereas in the 1970's, smoking was equally prevalent at all ages between 20 and 60 years, with lower rates for under 16s and over 60s, the peak prevalence for both men and women is now 20-24 years, falling progressively with age. The social profile of smoking has also changedfor both men and women -and smoking has become increasingly a lower rather than a cross class activity. This trend has been especially marked for women. About 40% of women in all social classes were smokers in the 1960's. By the early 1990's, only 13% of women in the highest social groups were still smoking, 35% in the lowest. This figure rose to 60% for lone mothers, a figure constant since the 1970's. 7 Smoking rates in young adults and trends over time show little difference by gender. Martin Jarvis, a leading smoking researcher, has commented '…deprivation and family circumstances are major predictors of smoking, with similar associations to current cigarette smoking in men and in women'. 8 The main cultural change in the post war years has been the increased marginalisation of smoking and its gradual closer association with poorer groups in society, both men and women, although most attention has concentrated on the latter.
Chronology of smoking policy in the United Kingdom.
The periodization assigned to post war smoking policy has been unclear. Most analysts to date have not been writing with historical change in mind. They have been concerned either with 'heroes and villains' history 9 . Or they have been concerned with the operation of networks and theories of policy influence, with static models of analysis 10 . The latter type of work has stressed the operation of rival 'issue networks' and 'producer networks' in policy. Historical work has dealt with the industry 11 ; that on the post war years has concentrated on the 1950s and the early epidemiological discoveries.
12
This paper emphasises rather a longer time scale and a four stage chronology for smoking policy. 13 In the first phase, the 1950s and 60s, smoking policy was marked by the cultural normality of smoking and by scientific and governmental uncertainty about the legitimacy of the new epidemiological 'facts' about risk. In the second phase in the 1970s, policy began to emerge at the governmental level. This was premised on the reduction of harm and of risk from smoking. It was marked by health education campaigns and voluntary agreements between government and industry, and on the scientific development of 'safer smoking', a strategy which also won support in public health circles. But overlapping with this phase came a new activist policy agenda which put the tobacco industry centre stage as 'the enemy' and which stressed the role of the media both as an agent of indoctrination, but also as a vehicle of public enlightenment about the risks of smoking. In the 1980's, my third phase, the science caught up with these new policy agendas and reinforced them :
ideas about risk expanded through the concept of passive smoking. In the 1990s came a further phase as the rediscovered concept of 'addiction' underpinned both new scientific alliances and a medicalised approach to smoking treatment and prevention policy. Health advice about individual behaviour modification, where it was given, had usually been aimed at women and children rather than at men: yet the latter section of the population formed the majority of smokers in the 1950s. This, to civil servants, was another factor militating against taking up the issue. 25 Taking up smoking as a public health issue also had implications for the nature and funding of health education which were unwelcome to central government. The pre war and wartime connotations of 'propaganda' made policy makers very wary of intervening in matters of individual habit and preference to prescribe preferred patterns of behaviour. Health advice of the time was notable for 'stating the facts' about smoking and leaving individuals to make up their own minds. Health conveyed the epidemiological case in a vivid way into both the public and the policy domains. The College's committee, originally on smoking and air pollution, began work in 1959. Its work was significant in a number of ways. Although its original focus was on educating doctors, the publicity given to the published report also brought the issue into the public domain and to the attention of policy makers. It also very clearly dropped any environmental association with the rise in lung cancer deaths. Individuals, its minutes record, could avoid the dangers of smoking, but not those of pollution. Air pollution, for the MRC as well, was a much bigger political issue. The committee was moving clearly towards a less politically contentious concept of health focussed more centrally on individual responsibility. 28 The response to the report within government was muted, focussing primarily on health education, a strategy which Enoch Powell, as Minister of Health, had recognised as ineffective in a 1961 minute. 29 The multiplicity of conflicting interests within government was clearly a factor. Treasury opposition to differential taxation ultimately prevailed, although not until the issue had been fully aired at the political level. This was not a foregone conclusion as the Cabinet committee discussions indicate. 30 The role of the industry was important, although its representatives were called in after the political decisions had been taken. Also behind these decisions lay a desire to achieve a balance in policy and a realisation that, without a huge change in the ' social positioning' of smoking, Robinson's desire to go further was however defeated by the opposition of Richard
Crossman, who was overall Minister at the Department of Health and Social Security.
When Robinson presented a draft bill to outlaw cigarette coupons to the Cabinet Home
Affairs committee in July 1968, Crossman's reaction was brusque.
'I…simply blurted out that this was another of those Bills which we simply couldn't afford to pass when we were running up to an election because bans of this sort made us intensely unpopular, particularly with children and families. If you're going to deal with the cigarette -smoking problem you should not try this kind of frivolous but intensely unpopular method. There was a tremendously violent reaction with everyone saying that here we must stand on moral principle. I heard it from Eirene White, Dick Taverne, and Edmund Dell, representing the Board of Trade which has switched its Junior Ministers round, and, indeed, I only had two or three people on my side. However, I'm still just powerful enough to hold the thing up and finally I suggested that instead of forbidding coupons we should ration the amount of money to be spent on advertising and leave it to the cigarette manufacturers to decide how they should spend their money. I found this infinitely preferable. Harmony achieved.' 32 The episode underlined the dominance of electoral rather than 'industry influence' considerations in policy strategies. Crossman's opposition was founded on a longstanding belief in the importance of smoking as a working class habit which had to be approached carefully for electoral reasons. His opponents included Dell, a Minister at the Board of
Trade, who might have been expected to have industry interests more at heart but did not in this instance take a pro industry line. The only formal legal restrictions in existence were those on sales to children which dated from the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the fears at that time of national degeneracy in the wake of Britain's defeat in the Boer War, modified again in the 1930s. 33 The reference to the turn of the century is relevant, because here, in the 1950s and 60s, we can see public health ' on the cusp', moving away from the mass campaign, service focussed public health ethos of the interwar years towards a new type of 'healthism'
epitomised by the concern about smoking. This was the harbinger of the lifestyle public health of the 1970s. In the 1950s and early 60s the concern was that government should not assume too lightly the responsibility for advising the general public on their personal tastes and habits. It was up to individuals, as good citizens, to modify these if they thought fit.
Meanwhile, both government, and public health interests, adhered to an agenda of reduction of risk. .This followed a policy line which stressed abstention rather than risk reduction and non cooperation with industry through a highly charged media campaign..
The regulation of these issues through voluntary agreement dated from 1971 when Sir
Keith Joseph was Secretary of State for Health. Joseph initiated a cross government study of smoking policy and its economic consequences, which was never officially published, and whose contents were only summarised in a Guardian article some nine years later 34 .The report concluded that either a twenty or a forty percent reduction in smoking would lead to a significant increase in the retired population. Small savings in health expenditure over twenty years would in due course be more than offset by increases in social security payments. But the main economic effects would be in revenue balance of payments and demand management fields. Consumer demand would rise if tobacco consumption fell .
Britain's balance of payments would deteriorate by £50m over a five year period if consumption dropped by 20%. The effects of increased taxation of cigarettes on consumption was unpredictable. Britain's impending entry into the EEC in any case made taxation a difficult option because duty was already at a higher level than in many European countries. 35 Joseph had initially planned an anti-smoking Bill, but scaled down his demands because of only moderate backing from colleagues . reports. 42 When ASH (Action on Smoking and Health) was set up in 1971 as an anti smoking pressure group, those who worried about joining the new committee because they were smokers, were told that it was cigarettes rather than smoking per se with pipes and cigars, which was the main concern. 43 This 'hierarchy of objectives' paralleled the early nineteenth century temperance movement, which aimed to eradicate spirit consumption rather than stopping drinking overall. During the 1970s, this harm reduction objective became much less important and abstention emerged as the major aim, with the tobacco industry as the enemy rather than collaborator in a shared agenda. 44 The roots of this significant change of public health stance were complex. New players entered the smoking policy arena and these had a significant impact on policy aims. (public health activist) networks. 52 However the situation was more complex-for public health and medical specialists were also involved on the product modification side through membership of ISCSH. As analyses of these events in both the UK and the US have commented, smoking control moved from being a matter of individual free will and the regulation of self control to a potential harm to the whole community and a threat to 'innocent victims'. 58 The smoker was an individual who harmed both him/her self and the environment and community at large. This shift in perception was congruent with changes in the 'new public health' which took on an environmental dimension in addition to the 1970's focus on individual lifestyle. 59 This was a 'scientific fact waiting to emerge', an illustration of the interpenetration between scientific ' fact creation' and policy : for ASH and other anti tobacco organisations had already begun to argue for this policy position in the second half of the 1970's. The arguments then tended to be on the basis of 'rights', and can be seen as a development of arguments put forward by an earlier interwar anti smoking organisation, the National Society of Non Smokers' (NSNS) which had argued against the ' nuisance' aspects of smoking and the selfishness of smokers in inflicting their habit on others. 60 The changes of the early 1980's gave this position the authority of science, changing a moral issue into a technical scientific one although with continuing moral overtones.
The 'fact' of passive smoking was, and has continued to be, the subject of debate. Some emanated from tobacco industry related organisations. 61 The scientific data on passive smoking were critically reviewed by the tobacco industry funded statistician Peter Lee.
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But the data were also regarded with some disfavour by anti tobacco researchers. Richard
Peto, a leading epidemiologist, pointed out that smoking tobacco was still the greatest risk to the individual smoker. 63 In 1998, the expert committee which had replaced the ISCSH, the Scientific Committee on Smoking and Health (SCOTH) published a further report on passive smoking which used meta-analysis, (a scientific compilation of the results of many different studies) to reaffirm its status as a scientific fact. It linked ETS (environmental tobacco smoke) to lung cancer, heart disease, SIDS, (suddent infant death syndrome) asthma and middle ear disease in children. The committee recommended that smoking in public places should be restricted among its other recommendations. 64 What was the overall impact of passive smoking as a scientific fact? It certainly symbolised a final rupture with the tobacco industry. 'They (the industry) wouldn't cooperate with me now. Passive smoking was the big watershed' said one epidemiologist in an interview. 65 . It coincided with an increasingly overt hostility to the industry on the part of public health researchers. 66 Nevertheless the voluntary traditions of policy remained strong and Britain deliberately avoided the route of legal regulation with much less emphasis also on law cases against tobacco companies. The particular issues it heightened were those of public visibility and regulation of public and workplace space. 67 But it also threw into sharp relief the tension within policy about what strategies were to be followed.
On the one hand,the dominant voluntary traditions of governmental policy making continued. As well as the more public agreements on advertising and sports sponsorship, cooperation between government and industry in the field of research also continued, with the involvement of leading researchers .The ISCSH committee worked, at arms length, with industry through the Tobacco Products Research Trust, set up with money from the industry under the terms of the 1980 and 1984 voluntary agreements. 68 The programme produced significant work on the role of nicotine, concluding that the toxicity of cigarettes might be reduced more if nicotine levels were reduced less then those for tar. 69 This continued the risk reduction strand within policy making.
Passive smoking also underpinned a harsher stance and the formation of new anti tobacco alliances. The developing role of the BMA (British Medical Association) was one example.
The organisation was reconstructing its rather fusty and doctor focussed image in the 1980s
by involvement in public health issues (AIDS was another example). It took up the smoking issue in 1984. Here, like the HEC and ASH, with whom it worked closely, the BMA took a high profile media conscious stance, opposing any notion of risk reduction.
This absolutist position was demonstrated in 1985 in the furore over Skoal Bandits, sachets of sucking tobacco. These made illegal by government in 1989 when regulations were introduced under section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act after a campaign led by ASH Scotland. 70 . This rare example of legal restriction was, significantly, of a product aimed at children. In the 1990s, the anti tobacco forces, looking to the US, also turned their attention to litigation, although with notably small success.
One anti smoking strategy was shared between government and anti tobacco forces. This dilemma was that tobacco taxes were indeed reducing smoking, but they had had little or no effect on those who smoked most and could least afford it -the poorest families, whose smoking rates had remained high. Tobacco taxation had therefore been a means of amplifying rather than reducing disadvantage.This was a difficult issue to air publicly in the mid 1990's because of implications for discussion of social security payments. 75 The initial media discussions can be seen as part of the reviving policy interest in inequalities ( or variations) in health.
1990s; addiction and a medicalised public health
Passive smoking had symbolised a ' new environmentalism' within public health as a whole,moving away from the the single focus on individual responsibility of the 1970s. The notion of ' involuntary smoking' first developed through passive smoking in the early 1980s, was modified. The lack of volition was now on the part of the individual smoker.
The concept of dependence or addiction (the two were distinct historically) had not been absent in the smoking field in the post war period, or before then, but had not had any particular policy significance. In earlier times, the idea of the cigarette as 'enslaving' had been part of general discourse. The concept of enslavement had however not been in tune with the key public health emphasis since the 1970s on self determination and individual responsibility. But addiction did become a central public health concept in the 1990s.
Epidemiology was forming new scientific alliances as its own ability to provide explanation came under increasing attack; these new relationships between different scientific arenas had already been demonstrated in the development of the scientific case for passive smoking where the discovery of 'markers' for smoke intake had helped strengthen the case. 76 For addiction, the evidence came from the field of psychopharmacology, the effects of drugs on the mind and brain , a scientific arena which had been largely separate from public health epidemiology in previous decades. Smoking researchers accepted the inequality arguments in relation to the impact of tobacco taxation, but argued that the root cause was dependence or addiction and that therefore 'treatment' was needed. The medical 'magic bullet' was nicotine replacement therapy (NRT), free to those on low incomes. This policy strategy paralleled the provision of methadone to drug addicts, another medical public health strategy which had attained increased priority in the wake of AIDS.
The prescribing history of NRT had been tortuous. It moved from a 'quack' remedy to one 78 The public health risk reduction agenda of the 1970s was to some degree reinstated ,but through a medicalised policy thrust. This was symbolic of a new ' pharmaceutical public health' emergent in the 90s,in which curative intervention and treatment technology were classified as prevention-as a public health activity. 
